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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper utilises a simulation exercise to analyse the possible effects of instituting a minimum wage 
policy in the South African labour market. 
 
The simulations are undertaken for three groups of unskilled labour categories, namely domestic workers, 
farm workers and drivers. The paper also examines the trade-offs of wage adjustments - specifically 
between poverty reduction effects and disemployment effects.  
 
The key results of the paper are firstly that the poverty response to wage policy is inelastic. Secondly, most 
poor domestic workers and farm workers are far below the poverty line. Thirdly, even if poverty reduction 
gains occur, they will be eroded by the resulting short-run employment losses associated with minimum 
wages. 
 
Minimum wage policy therefore plays a limited role in reducing poverty in South Africa. 
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1.  Introduction 
A key component of labour market policy debate in South Africa, has been around the role of 
wages in either hindering employment creation, or conversely as a tool for reducing poverty and 
acting as a catalyst for aggregate demand growth.  This debate has come to the fore more 
recently with the Department of Labour’s recent call for public submissions and public comment 
on the issue of minimum wages and conditions of employment for domestic and farm workers.  
An analysis of the first of these two issues, namely wages, will place into sharp focus the stringent 
trade-offs faced by the Department of Labour in this part of the workforce. 
This paper therefore attempts a very basic simulation exercise to test some of these hypotheses 
concerning the functioning and response behaviour of the labour market.  In trying to focus on 
the poor in the labour market, the study chooses three unskilled labour categories, with the 
emphasis being on the two most indigent groups amongst the employed, namely domestic 
workers and farm workers.  It is amongst these two groups, that the trade-offs between poverty 
reduction and employment losses are most starkly evident. 
2.  Employment and Wage Descriptors 
The analysis in this paper is based on the October Household Survey of 1995 (OHS95), which 
sampled about 30 000 households, drawn from 10 selected households in each of 3 000 clusters.  
It represents the second such survey undertaken by the government statistical agency – Statistics 
South Africa.  At the time of writing, the latest available household survey was that for 1997.  
However, both the 1996 and 1997 surveys did not survey respondents for actual wages earned, 
and in fact reports wages in pre-determined categories.  For the purposes of accurate simulation 
results therefore, this data is too inaccurate.  Hence, the OHS95, which does report actual wages 
earned, was utilised for the purposes of this paper. 
Before undertaking the two simulation exercises, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the 
labour market for these three occupations, namely drivers, domestic workers and farm workers.  
The driver1 occupation was chosen because while they also represented labourers, their 
employment, wages and conditions of service can be said to be more secure and of a higher 
quality than that for domestic and farm workers.  In this respect, the category offers an important 
contrast in terms of the nature of employment and poverty responses to wage adjustments 
amongst unskilled workers. 
It is clear from Table 1 that the largest of the three occupations is farm workers, with close to 1 
million workers.  Note that this is over 50% down from the 1970 employment figure, when the 
agriculture sector had a workforce of about 2.5 million (Bhorat, 1999).  It is interesting that the 
two most marginalised occupations amongst the employed constitute about 17% of all 
employment in the economy.  The racial distributions indicate a disproportionate share of African 
workers in all three occupations.  Note that while African workers constitute only 62% of total 
employment, they are clearly over-represented in these low skilled jobs and occupations.  This is 
mirrored for example, in the case of white workers who, while representing 22% of national 
employment form a negligible portion of the three occupations.  In short, the employment figures 
by race reflect the strong race-skills cleavage in the South African labour market. 
The gender data, powerfully illustrate the strong gender-specific roles attached to certain forms of 
employment.  Hence, while drivers are overwhelmingly male, domestic workers are 
predominantly female.  In the case of farm labourers, the number of women is larger, yet it still 
remains a male occupation.  In terms of national trends, 38% of all the employed are women.  
This would suggest that there is an over-representation of women in domestic services, and an 
under-representation of female workers amongst farm labourers and drivers. 
                                                 
1Drivers here include motor-cycle drivers; car, taxi and van drivers; bus and tram drivers; heavy truck and lorry 
drivers. 





Category Drivers Domestic Workers Farm Workers 
Race    
African 361 105 619 150 754 813 
 82.83 88.03 79.86 
Coloured 31 958 81 674 186 654 
 Share 7.33 11.61 19.75 
Asian 14 128 450 98 
 Share 3.24 0.06 0.01 
White 28 782 2049 3608 
 Share 6.60 0.29 0.38 
Total 435 973 703 323 945 173 
Share 100.00 100.00 100.00 
   
Gender    
Male 424 229 22 363 734 374 
 Share 97.31 3.18 77.70 
Female 11 744 680 960 210 799 
 Share 2.69 96.82 22.30 
   
Location    
Rural 156 104 409 170 882 387 
 Share 35.81 58.18 93.36 
Urban 279 869 294 153 62 786 
 Share 64.19 41.82 6.64 
Source:  OHS,1995 
The location data illustrate that while most drivers are urban-based, a fairly significant share do in 
fact work and reside in rural areas.  Interestingly, the majority of domestic workers are based in 
rural areas.  While the national trends are mimicked in the case of drivers, the location 
distribution for the other two occupations, reveal that a disproportionate share of these workers 
are in rural areas.  The location distribution for domestic and farm workers therefore, reflect their 
concentration in areas of the economy that are poor job generators and where jobs are available 
they are paid poorly with very low levels of employment security. 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the three occupations according to education levels.  It is 
immediately clear that the distribution for drivers is distinct from that of domestics or farm 
labourers.  While the majority of drivers possess incomplete secondary qualification, most farm 
and domestic workers have only primary education, with over a quarter of the former having no 
education. 
The national distribution of employment by education shows that 22.2% of all workers have 
primary education.  In other words, while the distribution for drivers matches the national trends 
more closely, the corresponding figure for domestics and farm workers is yet another cut 
displaying their vulnerability in the labour market.  The national figure for a matric is 22.7%, 
indicating that while at least 12% of drivers have this qualification, it is well below the national 






Table 1:  Basic Employment statistics: Drivers, Farm and Domestic Workers 





Source:  OHS, 1995 
The upshot of the above is that while drivers, domestics and farm workers are all nominally 
classified as labourers, it is evident that the latter two groups reveal employment patterns that 
suggest they may be a distinct, and particularly marginalised group, within the broad band of 
workers categorised as unskilled.  Nowhere is this fact truer than when examining the wage data 
for the three occupations.  Table 2 presents this evidence, by looking at the median and mean 




Occupation Driver Domestic Worker Farm Worker 
Median 1300 333.5 407.5 
Mean 1517.7 407.0 466.7 
Source:  OHS, 1995 
As previous evidence has shown (Bhorat & Leibbrandt, 1999), the lowest earners in the labour 
market are domestic workers, with a median wage of R333.5 per month.  Farm workers earn just 
over R400 per month.  In contrast, drivers earn a median that is 3 times higher than farm 
labourers and close to 4 times above that of domestics.  The national median wage is R1400, 
which is marginally above that of drivers, but substantially more than the other two occupations.  
In addition, the earnings data by race indicate that African and Coloured earnings are again 
between 2.5 and 3 times higher than that for domestics and farm workers.  To put into 
perspective how low these earnings are:  domestic workers earn a third of what the average 
miner earns, and fourteen times less than the average skilled professional.  Extremely low wages 
lead to the familiar outcome of individuals having a job, yet living in deep poverty.  In terms then 
of a parallel labourer category, the latter occupations are very low earners, and in terms of 
national trends, domestics and farm labourers must be considered as a special category of 
particularly disadvantaged employees.  In this respect, Figure 2 vividly presents this picture of 
extreme vulnerability amongst domestics and farm workers2.   
 
                                                 
2 Occupation 832 refers to drivers, 910 to domestic workers and 921 to farm labourers. 











Drivers 9.38 28.83 46.76 11.97 3.05
domesw 19.96 49.61 26.47 2.44 1.52
farmw 25.73 54.03 18.45 1.37 0.42
No Educn SubA-Std5 Std6-9 Matric Tertiary
Table 2:  Median and Mean Wages by Occupation 





























Source:  OHS, 1995 
The histograms make it visually very clear that the overwhelming majority of domestics and farm 
workers are stacked at the lowest end of the earnings distribution.  Conversely, the distribution of 
drivers’ earnings is far more evenly spread.  The importance of this distributional data will become 
clear in the simulations below, given that through the use of survey data we will be able to 
change the earnings of each individual in the sample, and hence affect the distribution in its 
entirety.  This would imply that increases in the wages of individuals, and the impact that it has on 
their poverty status, will depend significantly on where in the distribution they lie.  In addition, the 
overall income distribution pattern will also influence the net outcome from the simulated 
earnings increases. 
3.  Poverty and Employment Effects from Wage Adjustments 
Given the high levels of indigence noted above, it is useful to determine whether certain 
categories of labour market interventions, may have a tangible impact on the vulnerability of the 
affected workers.  Specifically, it may be useful to undertake a thought experiment, wherein the 
wages of the three occupations are increased, and to then examine the impact it has on poverty 
levels amongst the three categories.  In addition though, it is clear that these wage adjustments 
will have disemployment effects.  Therefore the second, and discrete, component of the analysis 
is to ascertain the employment effects of the same wage rate increases. 
This simulation exercise suffers from at least three drawbacks.  Firstly it only accounts for the first-
round poverty effects of a rise in the wages of individuals.  It is in essence, a very confined 
comparative static exercise.  Hence, the possible additional poverty-reducing impacts that may 
arise from additional resources provided to individuals is not accounted for.  Secondly, and in 
relation to the first drawback is that no indirect effects of a wage hike are accounted for.  These 
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structures of firms and employers, and this in turn may affect productive activity and income 
generation elsewhere in the economy.  Finally, the simulation operates only at the individual-level 
and does not reflect on the impact on household poverty. 
3.1  Poverty Impact Simulations 
Table 3 orients one concerning the incidence of poverty amongst the three occupations.  The 
table presents two poverty lines: R293 per month and R650 per month. The line of R293 per 
month corresponds to a single adult equivalent income used in deriving 1995 household poverty 
lines.  There can be very little contention that this is indeed a low labour market income.  The fact 
that R293 per month is lower than any of the median incomes noted above certainly illustrates 
this point.  The second poverty line of R650 is more closely derived at the household level, than 
the R293 figure.  In this case, R650 represents the wage required to the household poverty line, 
given the mean number of employed and unemployed individuals in a household.  In this way, 
one gets to a more accurate and realistic picture, of the earnings capability of each dwelling. 
All the same, as Table 3 shows, both poverty lines yield high levels of indigence.  At the lower 
poverty line, over a quarter of farm workers and close to 40% of domestics are poor.  By contrast, 
2.1% of all drivers earn below R293 per month.  The degree of vulnerability amongst domestics 
and farm workers is illustrated by the fact that at this poverty line, the national headcount index is 
7.25%. 
 
Poverty Line Driver Domestic Worker Farm Worker 
  R293 per month   
Number 9235 267 439 251 628 
Percentage 2.12 38.03 26.62 
  R650 per month  
Number 52 658 564 667 762 011 
Percentage 12.08 80.29 80.62 
Source:  OHS 1995 and author’s own calculations. 
Utilising the higher, and more realistic, poverty line results in significant increases in the 
headcount index.  Hence, over 80% of the two vulnerable occupations live in poverty at this line, 
compared to just over 10% of drivers.  Note that the measures for domestics and farm workers 
converge, given the similarity in income distributions of the two occupations.  The national 
measure, at this poverty line, is 25% and even for the African employed, the index is 33%.  This 
suggests that relative to parallel national measures of poverty these two occupations experience 
the greatest identifiable degree of vulnerability in the South African workforce. 
We now go on to examine the simulated impact on poverty levels amongst these three 
occupations, of specific wage adjustments.  In particular we look at the poverty outcomes from 
wage increases respectively of 5%, 10%, 50% and 100% to each of the individuals in the sample.  
Note that given the use of survey data, we are able to apply the simulated increase to each 
individual in the distribution.  Table 4 provides the results for a 5% and 10% increase in the wage 
rate respectively.  The table indicates very clearly that the poverty impact from the wage 
adjustments would, at best, be modest. 
Hence, the 5% rise in wages would shift only 19 000 farm workers and about 9 000 domestics 
out of poverty.  This constitutes a reduction of poverty in the range of 1.5% to 2.5%.  Noticeably, 
the figures for drivers are higher, suggesting of course that the wage adjustment would have a 
more tangible effect on their poverty status.  Should the wage of each individual in the two 
marginalised occupations increase by 10%, the results remain equally unspectacular.  Here, the 
percentage reduction in poverty would be just over 5% for the two groups.  Hence a wage hike 
to the value of inflation for the same year, would have a relatively insignificant impact on the 
poverty status of domestics and farm workers.  Note however, that the impact on drivers is very 
significant.  Here it is evident that poverty measures are highly responsive to the wage change.  
Specifically, the 10% wage rise has a more than 10% reduction in poverty levels amongst drivers.  
Table 3:  Baseline Poverty Levels, by Occupation 
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This suggests that most of the poor drivers are in fact stacked disproportionately quite close to 




Occupation Drivers Domestic Worker Farm Worker 
  5 % Increase in Wage  
No. in Poverty 50 896 555 708 742 700 
% in Poverty 11.67 79.01 78.58 
Reduction in Poverty (No.) 1762 8959 19 311 
% Reduction in Poverty 3.89 1.59 2.53 
     
  10 % Increase in Wage  
No. in Poverty 43 125 532 290 715 119 
% in Poverty 9.89 75.68 75.66 
Reduction in Poverty (No.) 9533 32 377 46 892 
% Reduction in Poverty 18.13 5.74 6.15 
Source:  OHS 1995 and author’s own calculations. 
Continuing with the wage simulations, it is possible to think of a much higher set of wage 
adjustments, in order to get a comprehensive sense of the elasticity of poverty with respect to 
wage adjustments.  Table 5 therefore provides the poverty results for a 50% and 100% wage 
change.  In terms of the former, the results show a tangible reduction in poverty with over 200 
000 farm workers and close to 120 000 domestics being taken out of poverty.  It is interesting 
that the results for poor drivers, are still higher, although not as sensitive a response is 
encountered as with the 10% wage change. 
 
 
Occupation Drivers Domestic Worker Farm Worker 
  50 % Increase in Wage 
No. in Poverty 30 337 447 041 535 478 
% in Poverty 6.96 63.56 56.65 
Reduction in Poverty (No.) 22 321 117 626 226 533 
% Reduction in Poverty -42.38 -20.84 -29.73 
    
  100 % Increase in Wage  
No. in Poverty 14 718 312 663 323 971 
% in Poverty 3.38 44.46 34.28 
Reduction in Poverty (No.) 37 940 252 004 438 040 
% Reduction in Poverty -72.02 -44.63 -57.48 
Source:  OHS 1995 and author’s own calculations. 
In turn, the 100% wage increase case shows that close to half and over a third of farm workers 
and domestics would be pulled above the poverty line.  Note though, that the number in poverty 
for each occupation is still over 300 000.  Hence for domestics and farm workers, there is still an 
insensitive poverty reduction response to the wage adjustment.  A doubling of each individual’s 
wage in the two distributions therefore, would elicit a 45% and 57% poverty incidence fall for 
domestics and farm labourers respectively.  While the sensitivity to the wage hike is greater for 
drivers, with poverty falling by 72%, the response does not still fully compensate for the wage 
adjustment. 
It should be evident from the above that in general poverty measures are inelastic with respect to 
changes in wage of each person in the sample.  Figure 3 graphically presents the data from Table 
4 and Table 5.  The figure maps the changes in wages to the outcome in poverty levels, for each 
of the three occupations.  These are in turn benchmarked against a ‘neutral’ outcome graph, 
which basically plots a 5% wage change as resulting in a 5% reduction in poverty and so on.  In 
other words, this function would present the equivalent of a unit elastic poverty response to wage 
changes.  It should therefore be evident from the graph that the poverty response, with the 
Table 4:  Poverty Effect of 5% and 10% Increase in Wages, based on R650 poverty line 
Table 5:  Poverty Effect of 50% and 100% Increase in Wages, based on R650 Poverty Line 
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exception of the 10% case for drivers, to wage changes has been inelastic.  In other words, the 
equal changes in wages, do not result in equivalent alterations in incidence of poverty.  Put 
differently, poverty measures are highly insensitive to very large wage adjustments for drivers, 
domestics and farm labourers.  In particular, Figure 3 shows that the responsiveness of poverty 




Source: OHS, 1995 
The results reflect on the nature of the income distribution, with respect to the poverty line, of 
domestics and farm labourers.  The fact that most of these workers are earning and working well 
below rather than simply close to the poverty line, means that even huge, and highly unrealistic, 
wage adjustments will do very little to eradicate poverty amongst these workers.  The extreme 
degree of vulnerability and indigence of these workers ensures this outcome under most 
conceivable wage scenarios.  This result of course means that the wage mechanism has limited 
use as an instrument of poverty reduction: that even if all other factors were held constant, 
increasing the wage rate of targeted workers will do very little to significantly erode the incidence 
of poverty amongst the most vulnerable employees. 
3.2  Employment Impact Simulations 
The above has shown that poverty levels are inelastic with respect to wage adjustments, 
meaning that the price of labour cannot be utilised as a poverty alleviation tool.  However, the 
obvious immediate impact of such a wage adjustment would be the negative impact on 
employment levels.  In this section then, I briefly examine the short-run employment effects of the 
wage adjustments, based on elasticities calculated for the South African economy by the World 
Bank (Fallon & Lucas, 1998).  Fallon & Lucas (1998) calculated elasticities for all formal sectors of 
the economy barring Agriculture, covering Black employees.  The estimates they derived are 
provided in the Appendix.  The aggregate elasticities for the period 1961-1993 were an average 
long-run wage elasticity of –0.71 and an average short-run (impact) elasticity of –0.156.  The 
former, -0.71, is probably the most widely quoted figure and has been corroborated by other 
evidence (Bowles & Heintz, 1996).  Noticeably, other more recent studies have yielded different, 
and in come cases, lower wage elasticities (Leibbrandt, Fields & Wakeford, 1999). 
The World Bank study does provide elasticity measures by sector, however due to the non-
coverage of Agriculture and the fact that drivers are not easily attached to any given sector, it was 
thought best to assign the aggregate elasticities to each of the occupations in the simulations.  
Hence, for each wage simulation undertaken, the assumption is of a short-run elasticity of -0.156, 
and a long-run estimate of –0.71. 
Table 6 presents the employment effects from a 5% and 10% wage adjustment.  The short-run 
here refers to a period of up to one year.  While the long-run results are not presented here, they 
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clearly would yield larger disemployment effects, given the higher value elasticity.  The long-run 
results are presented in the appendix.  The results suggest that with a 5% wage hike, over 5 000 
and more than 7 000 domestics and farm labourers would lose their jobs.  Collectively, the 5% 
wage increase would amount to 16 000 lost jobs. 
 
 
Race Drivers Domestic Workers  Farm Workers 
Total  435 973 703 323 945 173 
 
  5 % Increase in Wage  
Short-run elasticity  -0.78 -0.78 -0.78 
Short-run empl. Loss -3401 -5486 -7372 
New short-run empl. Level 432 572 697 837 937 801 
   
  10 % Increase in Wage 
Short-run elasticity  -1.56 -1.56 -1.56 
Short-run empl. Loss -6801 -10 972 -14 745 
New short-run empl. Level 429 172 692 351 930 428 
Source:  OHS 1995 and author’s own calculations. 
With the 10% wage simulations, the results are simply doubled, given the elasticity of –1.56.  
Hence a 10% wage adjustment translates into job losses in excess of 32 000 individuals.  It is of 
course difficult, using this framework, to assess the simultaneous impact on poverty and 
employment from the wage changes. However, what the two discrete experiments suggest is 
that, should there be a wage adjustment contemplated for specific occupations such as the one 
above, then combined with the modest poverty reduction effects, there will be fairly worrying job 
losses. 
The results for the 50% and 100% wage increases provide below, serve only to reinforce this 
point.  Hence it is evident that by giving workers 50% more than they previously earned, the job 
attrition rate would increase to over 160 000 jobs.  A comparison can be made here: while the 
50% wage hike meant that over 360 000 employees in the three occupations no longer lived in 




Race  Drivers Domestic Workers Farm Workers 
Total  435 973 703 323 945 173 
 
  50 % Increase in Wage 
Short-run elasticity  -7.8 -7.8 -7.8 
Short-run empl. Loss -34 006 -54 859 -73 723 
New short-run empl. Level 401 967 648 464 871 450 
 
  100 % Increase in Wage 
Short-run elasticity  -15.6 -15.6 -15.6 
Short-run empl. Loss -68 012 -109 718 -147 447 
New short-run empl. Level 367 961 593 605 797 726 
Source:  OHS 1995 and author’s own calculations. 
The figures for the 100% hike reveal that while the numbers in poverty fell by over 700 000, in 
the process some 325 000 jobs would have been sacrificed.  Thus while excessive wage gains 
would be necessary to achieve modest poverty reduction gains, these gains are further eroded 
through the resulting disemployment effects.  It is therefore important to keep in mind that there 
are of course multiplier effects from the job losses, at the household level.  So while individuals 
may be losing jobs, the impact is transmitted at the household level, where both adults and 
children are affected. 
Table 6:  Employment Effects from 5% and 10% Wage Increases 
Table 7:  Employment Effects from 50% and 100% Wage Increases 
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Ultimately then, the trade-off between poverty reduction on the one hand and the risk of 
employment loss is a severe one that derives from any wage adjustment plan.  The Department of 
Labour’s stated intention to call for public submissions on a minimum wage for domestic and 
farm workers is an indication of the consideration being given to a wage adjustment package for 
these workers.  The crisp point made here is that employment losses will be significant and will of 
course increase monotonically with any given wage hike contemplated by the Department. 
Conclusion 
The above has shown firstly that both domestic and farm workers are the most vulnerable 
cohort of employees in the South African labour market.  The comparison with a third labourer 
category, that of drivers, only served to reinforce this fact.  In this light the Department of Labour 
is considering a minimum wage policy for these two indigent groups.  The paper traced out some 
of the possible effects of pursuing such a wage policy.  Essentially the trade-offs revolve around 
the poverty reduction effects compared with the disemployment impacts from the wage 
adjustments. 
The results showed firstly that a wage policy pursued to reduce indigence amongst the target 
occupations will have a relatively small impact on poverty levels.  Specifically, poverty incidence 
was shown to be relatively inelastic with respect to wage changes.  It took very large, and in 
policy terms highly unlikely, wage adjustments to ensure a tangible poverty reduction impact.  
Secondly, it was evident that the results displayed the fact that most poor domestics and farm 
labourers were in fact quite far below the poverty line rather than earning just below R650 per 
month.  Thirdly the employment-wage results show that the Department’s policy would run the 
serious risk of significant short-run employment losses to accompany the poverty-reducing 
outcomes. 
The wage, it would seem, has a limited role to play in eradicating poverty amongst these two 
groups of workers.  In essence, the analysis suggests that poverty eradication amongst domestic 
and farm workers cannot take place solely through a minimum wage policy.  This is not the 
problem of minimum wage legislation per se, but rather the very high incidence of poverty found 
amongst domestic and farm workers.  Ultimately, if the Department of Labour were considering a 
minimum wage policy directed at reducing poverty levels amongst these workers, it would not 
serve the purpose of significant poverty alleviation amongst its target population.  This is true, it 
must be remembered, irrespective of what employment losses may occur from the minimum 
wage as well. 
Should the Department of Labour opt for a modest minimum wage, the poverty reduction 
consequences would of course be minimal and so too would the disemployment effects.  The 
Department would implicitly then be issuing a ‘moral signal’ to employers – that improved wages 
for these workers are to be striven for.  Such a wage would set a first-step benchmark for good 
wage practice amongst employers.  Indeed, such an initial minimum wage may set a positive 
trend, and see employers gradually increase the wages paid to these workers.  Ultimately, given 
the above figures, this option may be the best and most optimal available to the Department. 
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The following four set of histograms represent the graphic results 
from the wage simulations, where; 
 
totpay5   = 5% increase 
totpay1   = 10% increase 
totpy50   = 50% increase  
totpy100  = the doubling of the wage. 
 
 
Histograms by Occupation 
 
totpay5 









































































Race  Drivers Domestic Workers Farm Workers 
Total  435 973 703 323 945 173 
   
  5% Wage Increase 
Long-run elasticity  -3.55 -3.55 -3.55 
Long-run empl. Loss -15 455 -24 933 -33 506 
New long-run empl. Level 420 518 678 390 911 667 
   
 10% Wage Increase  
Long-run elasticity  -7.09 -7.09 -7.09 
Long-run empl. Loss -30 910 -49 866 -67 013 































Long-run Employment Effects from 5% and 10% Wage Change 
 totpy10
0  








Race  Drivers Domestic Workers Farm Workers 
Total  435 973 703 323 945 173 
    
  50% Wage Increase 
Long-run elasticity  -35.45 -35.45 -35.45 
Long-run empl. Loss -154 552 -249 328 -335 064 
New long-run empl. Level 281 421 453 995 610 109 
 
  100% Wage Increase 
Long-run elasticity  -70.9 -70.9 -70.9 
Long-run empl. Loss -309 105 -498 656 -670 128 












Sector Long-Run Short-Run 
Beverages -0.184 -0.095 
Tobacco -0.057 -0.018 
Textiles -0.984 -0.346 
Wearing Apparel -2.508 -0.709 
Wood Products -0.196 -0.603 
Furniture -0.364 -0.139 
Chemicals -1.166 -0.344 
Rubber and Plastic -0.243 -0.153 
Non-met Minerals -2.929 -0.451 
Basic Metals -0.758 -0.166 
Fabricated Metals -0.466 -0.175 
Non-Electr. Mach. -0.632 -0.408 
Transport Equipment -0.440 -0.201 
Mining -0.146 -0.118 
Construction -0.554 -0.360 
Services -0.948 -0.147 
Weighted Mean -0.709 -0.156 
  
Source:  Fallon and Lucas, 1998. 
Long-run Employment Effects from 50% and 100% Wage Change 
Long-run and Short-run Wage Elasticities for Black Formal Sector Employees 
